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FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION WITHIN THE




Any discussion of religion in the public school raises sus-
picion. While religious materials can be studied in literary
contexts,' decisions prohibiting school prayer,2 the teaching
of creation science,' and public and private school teachers
from teaching remedial classes to children in leased rooms of
private schools" have tended to exacerbate those suspicions.
Yet, the United States Constitution gives religion a unique
position among individual liberties.5 The first amendment ex-
pressly provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
* B.A. 1985, Thomas Aquinas College; J.D. 1989, University of Notre
Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1987-1989.
1. "[The] study of religions and of the Bible from a literary and his-
toric viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular program of edu-
cation, need not collide with the First Amendment's prohibition. Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
[I]t is worth noting that the Establishment Clause does not pro-
hibit per se the educational use of religious documents in public
school education. Although this Court has recognized that the Bi-
ble is "an instrument of religion," . . .it has also made clear that
the Bible "may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of
history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like."
Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 2590 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring)
(citation omitted). In an earlier case, the Court noted "an unbroken history
of official acknowledgement . . . of the role of religion in American
life ...." Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984), and recognized
that these references to "our religious heritage" are constitutionally ac-
ceptable. Id. at 677.
2. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 87 (1985).
3. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S.Ct. 2573 (1987) (striking down a Lou-
isiana law which provided for equal teaching time of creation science in the
public schools).
4. Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
5. The religious liberty as described by the free exercise clause pro-
vides a greater freedom from governmental interference than any other
segment of the Constitution. Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seri-
ously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 301.
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thereof. . . .'"I At one time, the free exercise and establish-
ment clauses were seen as mutually compatible 7-both work-
ing towards securing religious liberty. Now they are seen as
separate and distinct, perhaps even in opposition to one
another.'
Within the public school context, the primary focus of
the religion clauses has been on avoiding an impermissible es-
tablishment of religion. Little concern has been raised with
respect to secular requirements which may impede free exer-
cise rights. This concern, however, was raised recently in
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education.10 Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that the school board's requirement of the
mandatory use of a particular reading textbook series signifi-
6. U.S. Const. amend. I.
7. "To the Framers, the religion clauses were at least compatible and
at best mutually supportive." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW, §
14-2, at 814 (1978).
8. The resulting tensions have transformed the religion clauses "into
dual monsters lurking on either side of a narrow channel of constitutional-
ity, rather than twin manifestations of an identical principle." Paulsen, Reli-
gion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establish-
ment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 314 (1986). "By
broadly construing both clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the
channel between the Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or fed-
eral action must pass in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." Thomas
v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9. A free exercise case arises when a governmental requirement, sec-
ular in its purpose, is seen by a religious individual as violative of a sin-
cerely held religious belief. Under certain circumstances, the free exercise
clause requires that religious beliefs be accorded special protection. Of
course, if the government is too accommodating, claims of impermissible
advancement or establishment of religion may arise. But to the contrary,
The text of the Free Exercise Clause speaks of laws that pro-
hibit the free exercise of religion. On its face, the clause is di-
rected at governmental interference with free exercise. Given that
concern, one can plausibly assert that government pursues Free
Exercise Clause values when it lifts a government-imposed burden
on the free exercise of religion.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
also McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 31 (argu-
ing that accommodation of religion is consistent with the political theory
underlying the Constitution).
10. 579 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tenn.) (dismissing all but one allegation
in plaintiffs' complaint), affd in part and rev'd in part, 582 F. Supp. 201
(E.D. Tenn. 1984) (granting summary judgment dismissing sole remaining
allegation in complaint), rev'd and remanded, 765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985),
647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (on remand, granting injunctive re-
lief and damages for plaintiffs), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1029 (1988).
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cantly burdened their free exercise rights." In a plurality de-
cision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed."'
This case comment addresses the holding and rationale
of the Sixth Circuit's decision and argues that the court failed
to properly apply Supreme Court precedent. Focusing on the
Sherbert v. Verner" line of cases, this note first sets forth the
basic free exercise principles enunciated by the Court. Part II
gives the background of the Mozert case, including relevant
facts and the disposition in the district court. Part III reviews
the analysis of the Sixth Circuit's decision. The three appel-
late judges agreed on the result, but in separate opinions,
sharply disagreed as to the proper constitutional approach.
None of the appellate opinions is found to be fully consistent
with interpretations enunciated by the Supreme Court. Fi-
nally, the note concludes by highlighting the special role of
the parents and the needs of children in the education pro-
cess; the importance of both went unaddressed in the appel-
late forum.
I. FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS AND THE SUPREME COURT
In early free exercise cases, the Supreme Court con-
strued the free exercise clause as a protection for religious
belief and opinion only.1 4 Such protection did not extend to
11. The plaintiffs were Fundamentalist Christians. From the testi-
mony as reported in the cases, the plaintiffs maintain some belief in separa-
tionism - that is, the faithful must avoid exposure to teachings and views
which contradict basic tenets of their faith and tend to alienate one from
God. The plaintiffs never expressly called their belief separationism. I use
this term, however, in an attempt to make their position more understand-
able. Separationism is described in further detail below. See infra note 91
and accompanying text.
12. Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058
(6th Cir. 1987).
13. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
14. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming the con-
viction of a Mormon for bigamy); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940) (the freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (the truth of one's religious
beliefs is not a matter which may be submitted to a jury); Torasco v. Wat-
kins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (state government may not make public office
conditional upon a religious belief; Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953) (government cannot penalize or discriminate against individuals or
groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (government may not em-
ploy the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious
views).
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any claim based upon religiously-motivated conduct.1" It was
not until 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner,'6 that the Court made a
significant departure from this belief-practice dichotomy. 7
There, the Court expanded its previously narrow construc-
tion of the free exercise clause.16 Although greater protec-
tion was still accorded to the freedom of religious belief, af-
ter Sherbert the Court extended some degree of protection to
religiously-motivated conduct.
In Sherbert, the Court ordered a state unemployment
board to pay compensation to Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-Day
Adventist, who had been fired for refusing to Work on Satur-
days." The Court held that a burden upon an individual's
15. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1960) (upholding the validity
of a state's "Sunday Closing Law" even though such a law interfered with
those Orthodox Jewish merchants whose religion compelled its faithful to
close down their businesses from sundown on Fridays until sundown on
Saturdays). This free exercise case also merits a note. The Court said that
"the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to the
appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs
more expensive." Id. at 605.
This belief-action dichotomy was a result of the dominant of two distinct
views of religion, each of which were represented in the religion clauses.
The establishment clause represents the view that government should be
protected from religion, while the free exercise clause reflects the view that
religion needs to be protected from the state. The establishment clause be-
came the dominant view, restricting the free exercise clause in its applica-
tion. The protection of the government from religious encroachment was
characteristic of the early religion clause jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court. Pepper, supra note 5, at 300-307.
16. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17. Some suggested that the reason for this change was ever-increas-
ing governmental involvement, both socially and economically, into society.
As the government undertakes a more active role in allocating resources
and structuring social order, the contexts in which religion and state inter-
act are multiplied. Developments in the Law - Religion and State, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 1607 (1987). Among those sharing this opinion is Justice Rehn-
quist. In his dissent in Thomas v. Review Board, he expressed the same
sentiment while also suggesting that the tension which now exists between
the establishment and the free exercise clauses is also due to this more ac-
tive governmental role. 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
18. "[N]o liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the free
society which our Constitution guarantees than is the religious liberty pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause .... " Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
19. The relevant unemployment law provided that to be eligible for
benefits, a claimant must "be able to work and . . . available for work";
and, further, that a claimant is ineligible for benefits "[i]f . . . he has
failed, without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work when of-
fered him by the employment office or the employer .... " Id. at 400.
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religiously-motivated conduct could only be justified by a com-
pelling state interest.2 0
The ruling of the unemployment board that the plaintiff
must either work on Saturdays or forgo unemployment bene-
fits created an impermissible burden on free exercise. This
ruling "forced her to choose between following the precepts
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand.""1
The Court next balanced this burden against the state
interest. It stated that "in this highly sensitive constitutional
area, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount inter-
ests, give occasion for permissible limitation."'" While South
Carolina alleged an interest in preventing fraudulent claims,
dissolution of the unemployment fund, and disruption of
work schedules,'3 the Court was unconvinced. Moreover,
even if such claims did constitute a compelling enough inter-
est, the Court noted, "it would plainly be incumbent upon
the [state] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regula-
tion would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights. (footnote omitted).""'
A. The Importance of Sherbert v. Verner
As already suggested, Sherbert's importance lies in its ex-
tension of protection to religiously-motivated conduct.35 This
Because Adell Sherbert refused to work on Saturdays, the unemployment
board found that she fell within the benefits disqualifying provision.
20. Id. at 407. This balance test approach was not a new invention.
In formulating the free exercise test, the Court drew from other first
amendment cases. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 407-08. The Sherbert Court
cited NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) and Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945) (both free speech cases) for its compelling state interest
requirement.
21. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. A later case phrased the burden re-
quirement in the following manner: "Where the state conditions receipt of
an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by religious faith, . . . a
burden upon religion exists. While-the compulsion may be indirect, the
infringement upon the free exercise is nonetheless substantial." Thomas v.
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707,
717-18 (1980).
22. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
23. Id. at 407.
24. Id. For the least restrictive means test, the Court cited Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association), Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943) and Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
(both freedom of speech and press).
25. This is not to say that the Court has itself always applied the Sher-
1988]
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
gave the clause some independent significance, for prior to
Sherbert, free exercise meant little more than freedom of wor-
ship, press, or speech.2 6 By protecting Adell Sherbert's reli-
gious practice of refusing to work on her Sabbath, the Court
essentially held that religiously-motivated conduct can be
burdened by a state practice. 7
Sherbert also ostensibly departed from the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect burdens8 articulated in the earlier
case of Braunfield v. Brown.29 In Braunfield, the Court differ-
entiated between legislation that had the purpose and effect
of making a religious practice unlawful and legislation which,
although directed at a secular purpose, indirectly imposed a
burden on a religious practice. 0 In Sherbert, however, the
Court showed concern that certain purely secular state regu-
lations which conditioned the receipt of public benefits could
bert test consistently. For a criticism of the application in subsequent cases,
see Note, Religious Exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Com-
peting Authorities, 90 YALE LJ. 350, 354 (1980). In each of these cases, how-
ever, the Court has at least applied the entire Sherbert test, although find-
ing an overriding state interest.
Professor Michael McConnell suggests a rationale for why the Court has
appeared inconsistent in its approach. McConnell, Neutrality under the Reli-
gion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146 (1986). He argues that certain situations
allow for deciding issues of whether a religious exemption should be per-
mitted (the unemployment context, for example). Other situations would
require an additional procedural determination, often times requiring the
government to evaluate the merits of the religious claim. Thus, where
there is a built-in mechanism for individual considerations, a free exercise
claim has a better chance of being accommodated. Id. at 154-57. McCon-
nell cautions, however, that this argument must not be treated as an excuse
for denying all free exercise claims. Id. at 157.
26. Pepper, supra note 5, at 309. Until Sherbert, the free exercise
clause had little distinction as an independent first amendment right. Pep-
per suggests that the Supreme Court is moving towards taking the Free
Exercise Clause more seriously and points out that the clause's history and
simple construction demonstrate that it offers broad protection. Religious
conduct itself is not inherently limited to communication and worship, but
it can extend to all aspects of human life. See id. at 301.
27. The specific burden at issue in Sherbert was the denial of unem-
ployment benefits for Adell Sherbert. The unemployment board refused to
acknowledge that a religious reason is a valid excuse for refusing to work.
28. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963).
29. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
30. Id. at 606-07. The Court in Braunfield said that indirect burdens
were not protected. However, the Court also noted that a State could enact
legislation whose "purpose and effect" is to "advance the State's secular
goals, [and that] statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious ob-
servance, unless "the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do
not impose such a burden." Id. at 607 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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significantly inhibit or deter the exercise of first amendment
rights. The Court said,
It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing
of conditions upon a benefit or privilege ..... .[T]o condi-
tion the availability of benefits upon [plaintiff's] willingness
to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effec-
tively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional
liberties. 1
After Sherbert, laws which create an indirect burden on
religious conduct can be constitutionally invalid3 2 if the state
fails to meet its required showing. The plaintiff must, of
course, make the threshold showing that a substantial bur-
den83 upon a sincerely held religious belief 4 exists.
Sherbert also instructs as to the showing the state must
make. The Court made clear that "only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interest, give occasions for permissi-
ble limitation." 5 In other words, only a "compelling [state]
interest" will justify the imposition of a burden on religious
31. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-06 (footnote and citations omitted).
32. This conclusion appears directly to contradict Braunfield. And
yet, the Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Braunfield, nor even
reconciled it with Sherbert. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 417, 421 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in result) (Harlan, J., dissenting), Thomas v. Review Board, 450
U.S. 707, 722-23 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33. "Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by religious faith, . . . a burden upon religion exists.
While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise
is nonetheless substantial." Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18. A state action will
be a substantial burden if it has the effect of undermining religious beliefs
or inhibiting religious practices. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 715 (1977) (state statute requiring display of license plate motto that
was religiously offensive to appellees violated free exercise clause because it
undermined their religious beliefs).
34. Although this is clearly a requirement, "religious beliefs need not
be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others in order to
merit first amendment protection." Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714. Some hold
that there must also be a showing that the religious belief is central to the
religion. See Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism": Pro-
posed Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Student's Religious
Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 385-96 (1986), for a good review of the
Supreme Court precedents giving guidelines for prima facie requirements.
If a particular belief is not central (as in important and necessary) it is ques-
tionable whether such a belief would meet the substantial burden
requirement.
35. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (quoting Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
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practice.3 6 The state must show both the compelling state in-
terest involved and the harm affecting the interest in the
event of a religious exemption."7 Moreover, in showing a
compelling interest, the state must indicate why it cannot be
accomplished through less restrictive means. The evidence
which supports this claim must not be merely speculative in
nature; the state must present facts. The Sherbert Court made
it clear that the mere possibility of fraudulent unemployment
claims was insufficient to warrant the substantial infringe-
ment of religious liberties."
B. Sherbert's Progeny: Yoder, Thomas, and Hobbie
Nine years after Sherbert, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 9 the
Court held that enforcing Wisconsin's compulsory education
law against the Amish burdened their free exercise rights. In
applying Sherbert, the Court stressed that the state must show
a specific interest of sufficient magnitude to justify imposing a
burden on religion.4 The imposition of the burden must be
essential, and it must be the least restrictive means to achieve
the state interest, as applied to those religious plaintiffs. "[W]e
must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to
promote by its requirement. . . and the impediment to those
objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed . . .
exception."4 In Yoder, the Court was not convinced by the
state's general interest in compulsory education. Although
the Court recognized that such a general interest existed, the
state had to demonstrate a specific interest in compelling
Amish children to attend school past the eighth grade. It was
not able to do this.
42
36. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
37. Id. at 407.
38. Id.
39. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder held that the Amish parents and chil-
dren were exempt from Wisconsin's Compulsory School Attendance laws.
The Amish believed that any exposure to any public or private schooling
beyond the eighth grade would endanger the salvation of the children.
This is due to the belief that higher education tends to develop values
which alienate men from God. Salvation for the Amish, therefore, requires
a life in their religious community separate and apart from the world
community.
40. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. For additional commentary on this aspect
of Yoder, see Paulsen, supra note 8, at 350 n. 173; Pepper, supra note 5, at
310; Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1228.
41. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 240-41. The state failed to demonstrate that the Amish
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In Thomas v. Review Board,"' by a vote of 8-1 , 44 the Su-
preme Court again affirmed the Sherbert approach. Thomas in-
volved a Jehovah's Witness whose religious beliefs forbade
him from contributing to the production of weapons. 4 The
Indiana Employment Review Board denied Thomas unem-
ployment benefits because he terminated his job for reasons
which the Board found did not amount to "good cause." Re-
jecting the Board's ruling, the Court stated, "Where the state
conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct pro-
scribed by religious faith . . . a burden upon religion exists.
While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement
upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.""'
Despite the broad language in Thomas describing situa-
tions where a burden can exist, the Court has been hesitant
to extend free exercise protection in more recent cases. 4 To
some, this suggests a step back from the seemingly expansive
approach implied from the Thomas language.' In two of the
children would be intellectually undeveloped if they leave school after the
eighth grade. The Court also noted that the state's valid interest in educa-
tion has already been largely satisfied in the particular case of the Amish
children and, further, that the Amish community itself provides the voca-
tional education necessary for life in their community.
43. 450 U.S. 707 (1980). The Supreme Court said: "Unless we are
prepared to overrule Sherbert, Thomas cannot be denied the benefits due to
him .. " Id. at 720.
44. Justice Rehnquist wrote the only dissenting opinion. He wrote:
"Because I believe that the decision today adds mud to the already mud-
died waters of First Amendment jurisprudence, I dissent." Id.
45. The plaintiff worked in a steel foundry. When the department he
was initially employed in closed down, his employer transferred him to an-
other department which was engaged in the fabricating of turrets for mili-
tary tanks. Since all of the employer's remaining departments were directly
engaged in the production of weapons, Thomas quit his job.
46. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
47. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S.Ct. 1310 (1986) (upholding valid-
ity of an Air Force regulation which prevented the wearing of a yarmulke
by the plaintiff while on duty and in uniform); Bowen v. Roy, 106 S.Ct.
2147 (1986) (statutory requirement that a state agency utilize Social Secur-
ity numbers in administering welfare programs does not violate the free
exercise clause); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Amish em-
ployer's objection to mandatory participation in the Social Security system
was outweighed by the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax
system). But see Jensen v. Quaring, 105 S.Ct. 3492 (1985) (per curiam) (a 4-
4 decision upholding a lower court's decision requiring the State of Ne-
braska to make a photo-less drivers' license available to a woman who held
a religious belief against the use of a photo) affg by an equally divided Court
Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984).
48. Despite the state's heavy burden in the Sherbert test, the Court
has found only four times in the past 25 years that neutral governmental
19881
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recent cases, the Court departed from the Sherbert standard
and employed a reasonableness test when considering the
state's interest. " In those cases 0 the government met its bur-
den by showing that the challenged regulation was a "reason-
able means of promoting a legitimate public interest.""'
However, in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,52 de-
cided in 1987, the Court once again expressly affirmed the
Sherbert approach.
In Hobbie, Paula Hobbie was discharged from her job at a
jewelry store when she refused to work certain scheduled
hours due to religious convictions. Once again, the Court
policies violate the free exercise clause. (Sherbert, Yoder, Thomas and Hobbie).
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 1046 (1987). Mc-
Connell suggests that the reason for this is the exercise of judicial restraint.
Given the numerous opportunities for conflict between faith and
government, the free exercise clause would become a serious in-
fringement on the government's ability to perform its functions
were the Clause not confined to the most serious burdens on reli-
gious exercise and did not take into account the government's le-
gitimate interest in denying religious exemptions.
McConnell, supra note 9, at 30.
McConnell also attempts to explain why the Court has been seemingly
inconsistent. He draws from statements of Justice Stevens in Goldman, 106
S.Ct. 1310 (1986), and Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). McConnell, supra note
25, at 154-57. In Lee, Justice Stevens' concurrence stated that the principal
reason for rejecting the claim was to keep government out of the business
of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims. Id. at 154.
McConnell quotes the Court in Bowen v. Roy, 106 S.Ct. 2147 (1986), as
explicitly stating this principle:
Although in some situations a mechanism for individual considera-
tion will be created, a policy decision by a government that it
wishes to treat all applicants alike and that it does not wish to be-
come involved in case-by-case inquiries into the genuineness of
each religious objection to such condition or restrictions is entitled
to substantial deference.
Roy, 106 S.Ct. at 2156.
The inference that McConnell draws from this statement is that where
the government is already involved in case-by-case determinations, then ac-
commodation for legitimate religious needs is appropriate. Moreover, the
Roy Court itself stated that in some instances the religious claim for exemp-
tion will be so strong that the government may be required to establish
procedures for its recognition. Id.
49. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S.Ct. 1310 (1986), and Bowen v.
Roy, 106 S.Ct. 2147 (1986).
50. The lower standard in these cases may be explained by the some-
what idiosyncratic circumstances involved-the military or the ability of
the government to organize its own operations.
51. See Roy, 106 S.Ct. at 2156.
52. 107 S.Ct. 1046 (1987).
53. Paula Hobbie was a Seventh-Day Adventist. However, it was not
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found that the denial of unemployment benefits by the unem-
ployment board violated the free exercise clause." Most im-
portantly, in evaluating the state interest, the Hobbie Court
expressly rejected the reasonableness standard of Goldman
and Roy and once again applied the Sherbert strict scrutiny
and compelling state interest test.55 Thus, with some inconsis-
tency the Supreme Court subjects indirect governmental bur-
dens on the free exercise of religious conduct to strict
scrutiny.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE Mozert CASE
The plaintiffs in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Educa-
tion were Fundamentalist Christian school children and their
parents.56 The children attended public schools in Hawkins
County, Tennessee. The plaintiffs challenged the Hawkins
County School Board's policy ordering the exclusive use of
the Holt reading series. They argued that the use of the se-
ries57 was fundamentally at odds with the religious teachings
and beliefs of the students and parents and, absent a compel-
ling state interest, the school board must provide an accom-
modation for their religious practice. Specifically, the plain-
tiffs requested that they be allowed to opt-out of the "critical
reading" course and to fulfill the requirement of the course
through the use of some other state approved texts.
The Hawkins County Board of Education adopted the
Holt reading series in 1983 for use in its elementary and mid-
dle schools." This series would serve as the basic reader for
until two years after her hiring that she became a Seventh-Day Adventist.
54. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 1048.
55. Hobbie, 106 S.Ct. at 1049.
56. The plaintiffs consisted of seven families-14 parents and 17
children. The children attended various elementary and middle schools
within the Hawkins County School District in Tennessee.
57. The textbook series in this case was the Holt Basic Readers text-
book series [hereinafter Holt series] published by Holt, Rinehart & Win-
ston. This is the textbook which the Hawkins County School Board has
chosen for use in the first through the eighth grades. This textbook is just
one of several Tennessee state-approved readers.
58. The Holt series was recently part of a nation-wide survey whose
purpose was to investigate systematically how religion and traditional val-
ues are represented in today's public school textbooks. The detailed find-
ings are given in P. VITZ, CENSORSHIP: EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN CHILDREN'S
TEXTBOOKS (1986). A summary is given in Vitz, A Study of Religion and
Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RE-
NEWAL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (R. Neuhaus ed. 1987).
The summary of the findings stated, "Altogether, the basic readers in
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its critical reading course 9 required to fulfill a state statutory
requirement calling for "character education" in their curric-
ula.60 This statutory requirement is designed "to help each
student develop positive values and to improve student con-
duct as students learn to act in harmony with their positive
values to become good citizens in their school, community,
and society."6 According to the testimony of the school
board's witnesses, the development of critical reading skills
required students to "read and discuss complex, morally and
socially difficult issues." 6
Soon after the reading series was adopted, one of the
parent-plaintiffs examined the Holt reader and discovered a
number of subjects, including witchcraft, magic, secular hu-
manism, feminism and socialism, which were offensive to her
family's religious beliefs. 63 She organized a meeting attended
by similarly situated parents and two Hawkins County school
principals. In addition to this, a group of Hawkins County
residents (which included most of the plaintiff-parents)
formed an organization called Citizens Organized for Better
Schools (COBS). This group informed the school board of
their objections to the Holt series."
the sample ...clearly represent a systematic denial of the history, heri-
tage, beliefs, and values of a very large segment of the American people."
Id. at 140.
59. The local school boards are empowered with the ability to choose
their local textbooks from state approved lists. In theory, this method of
local action is consistent with the ideal that schools ought to be locally run,
in order to meet the needs of the individual communities in which they
reside. One commentator claims this is a myth. He claims that in recent
years, the state boards of education are the ones determining the curricula,
selecting textbooks, and certifying teachers. Moreover, the federal govern-
ment also maintains control in that it requires schools to follow certain
mandates in order to qualify for the needed federal aid. Baer, American
Public Education and the Myth of Value Neutrality, in DEMOCRACY AND THE
RENEWAL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1, 3-4 (R. Neuhaus ed. 1987).
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1007 (Supp. 1986).
61. Id. at § 49-6-1007(a) (Supp. 1986).
62. Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058,
1071 (6th Cir. 1987).
63. The Sixth Circuit opinion states several things which the plain-
tiffs find offensive. These topics include witchcraft, magic, secular human-
ism, feminism, one-world government, and socialism. However, plaintiffs
also testified that the books contained several stories which directly contra-
dicted teachings of the Fundamentalists' belief. One example is the view-
point that there are many roads to God-not simply a belief in Christ. Id.
at 1065.
64. Although COBS also petitioned the school board for removal of
the Holt series, the Mozert plaintiffs did not seek removal in their subse-
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Six of the plaintiff families directly contacted the princi-
pal of the Church Hill Middle School and requested alterna-
tive reading material for the children. The school acceded to
these requests. Other children at some of the other Hawkins
County schools were also provided with alternative texts.61
On November 10, 1983, however, the school board adopted
a resolution requiring teachers to "use only textbooks
adopted by the Board of Education as regular classroom
texts." 66 Following this, the student-plaintiffs refused to read
from the Holt series. The schools, in response, suspended the
students. Most of the parents then enrolled their children in
private schools.
7
The Mozert plaintiffs filed an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging that the school board's regulation mandating
use of the series burdened their free exercise of religion."
quent action against the school board.
65. To be exact, seven of the student-plaintiffs from the Church Hill
Middle School, one from Church Hill Elementary School, and one from
Mt. Carmel Elementary School were given alternative reading textbooks.
However, two other plaintiff families were denied such accommodations by
the principal at Carter Valley Elementary School.
66. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194,
1197 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
67. Despite the resolution, two of the students were allowed to re-
turn to the public schools and were not required to read from the Holt
series.
68. Plaintiffs alleged the following reasons for the books being objec-
tionable. The books:
1. teach witchcraft and other forms of magic and occult
activities;
2. teach that some values are relative and vary from situation to
situation;
3. teach attitudes, values, and concepts of disrespect and disobe-
dience to parents;
4. depict prayer to an idol;
5. teach that one does not need to believe in God in a specific
way but that any type of faith in the supernatural is an accept-
able method of salvation;
6. depict a child who is disrespectful of his mother's Bible study;
7. imply that Jesus was illiterate;
8. teach that man and apes evolved from a common ancestor;
and,
9. teach various humanistic values.
Perhaps the most important of these claims are the fifth, sixth, and sev-
enth allegations. The reason for this is the plaintiffs' explicit fundamental
belief that Jesus Christ is the only means of salvation. The Holt series, it
was alleged, embodied a world-view according to which all religions are so
many different roads to God. See Mozert, 579 F. Supp. at 1052; Mozert, 582
F. Supp. at 202.
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The parents also claimed interference with their parental
right to control the religious and moral upbringing of their
children.6 9 The plaintiffs sought, as relief, to enjoin the de-
69. The parents in the Mozert case alleged a violation of their free
exercise rights and also a violation of their fundamental right to control
the religious and moral upbringing of their children. (The parents' claims
were never separately addressed by the courts.)
The Supreme Court has decided cases which support this right of the
parents. Such a claim has been supported by the fourteenth amendment's
liberty clause. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(upholding the right of parents to send their children to private schools),
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) (invalidating a law which made it
illegal for a school teacher to teach foreign language to school children).
At common law, however, the state recognized a fundamental right of
the parents to have their children excused from certain courses. This right
was conditioned upon the fact that the parent's request to have the chil-
dren excused was reasonable and consistent with the best interests of the
child, as well as that of the efficiency and good order of the schools and the
equal rights of the other students not to be affected by the parental con-
trol. See Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a Right
to Have One's Child Excused From Objectionable Instruction? 50 S. CAL. L. REv.
871, 886 (1977). Two basic assumptions supported this right. First, the law
recognized the parent's equal or superior knowledge of the child's physical
and mental capabilities and future prospects in comparison to the school
authorities. Second, due to the natural affections of a parent for a child,
the parent is more likely to act in the best interest of the child. Id. at 889.
Modern statutory laws, however, have eroded this common law right. The
recognized compelling state interest in education has weakened any abso-
lute parental control over the education of children.
It is common, however, for a state statutorily to provide for the right of
a parent to exempt their children from such courses as health and/or sex
education classes which they find objectionable, for whatever reason. See,
e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 15.41507(4) (1979).
The state's interest in education has allowed state interference with pa-
rental liberty. However, for very good reasons, the judiciary does give a
large degree of deference to parental control of a child's education and
welfare. First, parents are more aware and sensitive to their children's
needs. Secondly, in a normal family setting, parents will act in the child's
best interest because of the close familial relationship. Finally, the parental
right to control the child's upbringing preserves the diversity of American
society and serves as a barrier to state indoctrination. Developments in the
Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1354 (1980).
Although some commentators would argue that the parental right to
control their child's education is a constitutional right, see, e.g., Devins, A
Constitutional Right to Home Instruction? 62 WASH. L. REV. 623 (1975), Stock-
lin-Enright, The Constitutionality of Home Education: The Role of the Parent, the
State and the Child, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563 (1982), Moskowitz, Parental
Rights and State Education, 50 WASH. L. REV. 623 (1975), one clause of the
Constitution does provide for a limited right - the free exercise clause.
The Yoder decision contains very strong language supportive of the par-
ent's free exercise claim. The Court held that states should respect paren-
tal decisions unless it appears that their decisions "will jeopardize the
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fendants from compelling the children to attend the reading
course in which the Holt series was used and to order the
schools to allow the children to read alternative state ap-
proved texts in place of the Holt readers."'
III. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION
After some procedural maneuvering,"' the district court
health or safety of the child or have a potential for significant social bur-
dens." Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). As one commentator
put it: "Yoder is pregnant with possibilities for constitutional protection of
parental autonomy." Stocklin-Enright, supra, at 563. The consideration of
the fundamental right of parents to guide the education of their child, cou-
pled with the free exercise claim, formed the basis for the Court holding
that the Amish parents had the right to remove their children from the
public school. The Court itself acknowledged the impossibility of recon-
ciling the state's interest with that of the Amish parents and clearly found
that a burden upon the free exercise rights of the parents existed. "This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
clearly established beyond debate as an enduring American Tradition."
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
70. The Mozert plaintiffs did not seek a ban on the Holt series or
attempt to show that the Holt series was teaching the religion of secular
humanism.
Those who bring a claim under the free exercise clause generally seek as
relief something along the lines of a religious exemption from the state
requirement. This notion of accommodation, which began in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), runs through the free exercise cases. See
Note, supra note 25, at 353-54 (1980). The Supreme Court has already
allowed the opt-out or released-time concept. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952) (the Court upheld a released-time program of public
school children for religious instruction).
According to Tribe, this notion of accommodation is arguably required
by the religion clauses in general. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-4 at 822.
71. The Mozert case began in the district court in July of 1983 where
the court heard defendant's FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal. In
the trial court's first opinion it dismissed all but one of the plaintiffs' allega-
tions. The court stated that the first amendment does not protect "from
exposure to merely offensive value systems or ...to antithetical religious
ideas." 579 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). However, if the plain-
tiffs could show that the books "teach a particular religious faith as true
• ..or that the students must be saved through some religious pathway, or
that no salvation is required .... ," then the motion for dismissal would be
denied. Id. In its second opinion, the same court dismissed the final allega-
tion, finding that no constitutional burden existed. 582 F. Supp. 201, 203
(E.D. Tenn. 1984). In 1985, the plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Finding that the pleadings presented genuine issues of
fact, the Sixth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded for
findings consistent with the opinion. 765 F.2d 75, 78-79 (6th Cir. 1985).
The court specifically directed the district court to apply the two-step free
exercise analysis regarding the questions of the burden and the counter-
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for the eastern district of Tennessee granted an injunction in
favor of the plaintiffs.7 2 The injunction prohibited defend-
ants from requiring the plaintiff-students to read from the
Holt series and ordered the defendants to allow the students
to attend the Hawkins County public schools, but to opt-out
of the regular reading course .7 This latter requirement was
conditioned upon the willingness of the parents to instruct
the children in reading at home in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Tennessee Home Schooling Statute.7 4
Relying upon Supreme Court precedent,7 6 the district
court found that since the school board had effectively re-
quired the students either to read from the Holt series or to
forgo their free public education, the school board's compul-
sory reading requirement impermissibly burdened the plain-
tiffs' free exercise of religion. Since the school board's action
was essentially the conditioning of a receipt of a public bene-
fit upon forgoing a religious belief, "the case was clearly in
line with Thomas, Sherbert and their progeny.' '76
The district court next examined the state interest to de-
termine whether it was compelling and whether the means
used to achieve that interest were the least restrictive possi-
ble. The compelling state interest-education of the
youth-was undisputed." The means chosen by the school
board to achieve this end, however, was problematic. The
district court phrased the issue in this manner: "whether the
state can achieve literacy and good citizenship for all students
without forcing them to read the Holt series."718 The court
answered this in the affirmative, finding that the mandatory
use of one textbook series was not the least restrictive means
available.7 Proceeding to fashion relief in a manner which
balancing state interest. Id. Judge Hull's final opinion, 647 F. Supp. 1194
(E.D. Tenn. 1986), is the opinion treated in the text above.
72. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194
(E.D. Tenn. 1986).
73. Id. at 1203.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1199-1200. In his burden analysis, Judge Hull relied on
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Thomas v. Review Board,
450 U.S. 707 (1980). He also looked to two lower court decisions involving
free exercise claims within the public school curriculum: Spence v. Bailey,
465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972), and Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270
(C.D. I1. 1979).
76. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1200.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1201.
79. Id. In making this finding, the court noted that Tennessee, as a
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would avoid entanglement with the establishment clause, 80
the district judge ordered that the student-plaintiffs be al-
lowed to opt-out of the regularly scheduled reading program.
He emphasized, however, that the "opinion shall not be in-
terpreted to require the school system to make this option
available to any other person or to these plaintiffs for any
other subject." '
IV. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT OPINION: Mozert REVIEWED AND
REVERSED
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed. 82 Finding that the necessary element
of coercion 8 was missing, the appellate court held that "the
state, has already acknowledged that its compelling interest in education
may be accomplished in other ways. Both private schooling and home
schooling are permissible. Moreover, as the court pointed out, the defend-
ant's arguments for uniformity in the classroom instruction is weakened by
several other factors: the defendant's own expert witness testified that
"teaching is best accomplished through individualized means," the evi-
dence of accommodations already practiced in the schools, and the narrow-
ness of the plaintiffs' complaints (as directed against the Holt series alone).
Perhaps one of the biggest holes in the defendant's arguments was the
complete lack of evidence showing the adverse and detrimental effects on
either the school's efficiency or the children's performance that defendants
continued to allege against the opt-out remedy. In fact, the court re-
marked, the student-plaintiffs performed above average despite their re-
fusal to use the Holt series.
80. Id. at 1203.
81. Id.
82. Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058
(6th Cir. 1987). Chief Judge Lively wrote the opinion of the court; Judge
Kennedy concurred in the analysis and the result, but decided to write a
separate decision to consider the mooted "compelling state interest" issue;
Judge Boggs concurred only in the result and accepted neither argument.
He reasoned that no constitutional burden exists because the Supreme
Court precedents do not extend so far as to cover the particular facts of
the case. Instead, he considered the case as one dealing with the limits on
school boards to determine curricula. Since he concluded that the only lim-
itation is the establishment clause, the plaintiffs had no claim. Yet, even
with three separate opinions, no explanation of the result commanded the
adherence of these three judges in a majority opinion.
83. Id. at 1066. In discussing the aim of the free exercise clause,
Judge Lively stated,
It is clear that governmental compulsion either to do or refrain
from doing an act forbidden or required by one's religion, or to
affirm or disavow a belief forbidden or required by one's religion,
is the evil prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. In Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1572,
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requirement that public school students study a basal reader
series chosen by the school authorities does not create an un-
constitutional burden under the Free Exercise Clause when
the students are not required to affirm or deny a belief or
engage or refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or
required by their religion."84 Each of the three opinions in
Mozert are discussed below.
A. Judge Lively's Opinion for the Court
The district and appellate courts disagreed principally
over whether there was a burden upon a religious belief or
practice. The appellate court found no burden to exist. As
Judge Lively wrote, since the "students were not required to
affirm or deny a belief or engage or refrain from engaging in
a practice prohibited or required by their religion," the
plaintiffs' failed to demonstrate the element of compulsion
necessary to the finding of a burden.85
Defining compulsion narrowly, Judge Lively stated that
the plaintiffs must show that "an objecting student was re-
quired to participate beyond reading and discussing assigned
materials, or was disciplined for disputing assigned materi-
als."86 Faulting the district court for "erroneously appl[ying]
decisions based on governmental requirements that objecting
parties make some affirmation or take some action that of-
fends their religious beliefs, 8 Judge Lively distinguished the
cases relied upon by the district court. Specifically referring
to Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie, Lively stated that each of
those cases involved governmental compulsion which forced
10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963), the Court described the Free Exercise
Clause as follows:
Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by
prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. Hence it is
necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive ef-
fect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of
his religion . ..
84. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1070. The district court, in Mozert, 647 F.
Supp. at 1204, made several findings in accordance with the remand in-
structions of the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit, in Mozert, 827 F.2d 1058,
reversed the specific finding that a burden existed. Judge Lively's opinion,
the opinion of the court, never addressed the other finding required in the
remand instructions - that the state could achieve its compelling state in-
terest (achieving student literacy and citizenship) through a less restrictive
means. However, both of the "concurring" opinions do address this second
finding.
85. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1070.
86. Id. at 1064.
87. Id. at 1065.
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the plaintiff to engage in conduct which constitutes affirma-
tion or denial of a religious belief."
Judge Lively's opinion is contrary to both Sherbert and
Thomas because it fails to recognize that the free exercise
clause protects religiously-motivated conduct.89 In this re-
gard, the district court made a specific finding that the
"[p]laintiffs' religious beliefs compel them to refrain from ex-
posure to the Holt series."' 90 While the plaintiffs' religious be-
lief is a separationist belief," this characterization does not
make it less religious. For these Fundamentalist Christians,
mere exposure to views and practices (from which the "faith"
requires them to remain separate and insulated) can be a sub-
stantial burden on their religious exercise." Judge Lively's
88. Id.
89. See supra Part I.
90. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194,
1200 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). Moreover, as Judge Boggs pointed out, "[t]he
plaintiffs provided voluminous testimony of the conflict (in their view) be-
tween reading the Holt readers and their religiousbeliefs, including exten-
sive Scriptural references." Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1076 (Boggs, J.,
concurring).
91. The Mozert plaintiffs sincerely believe that they must not be ex-
posed to the contents of the Holt series. They never refer to this belief as
separationism. However, I use the term broadly to refer to a religious be-
lief that the faithful must avoid or keep separate from those views or prac-
tices which conflict with their religious beliefs. I use separationism in two
senses. The first is an absolute separationism, requiring a complete and
separate existence from the world community. The Amish are perhaps the
best example of such a belief. The second sense in which separationism can
be understood is partial separationism. This requires an avoidance of cer-
tain practices or views from which a religion requires, for whatever rea-
sons, its believers to abstain. Catholics are one example of religious believ-
ers who hold some kind of belief in partial separationism. As Judge Boggs
pointed out, at one time the Roman Catholic Church specified a list of
books in the "Index Librorum Prohibitorum," the reading of which was a
sin. Mozert, 827 F.2d 1058, 1075 (Boggs, J., concurring) (citing 7 NEw
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, 434-35 (1967); 2 id. at 699-701.) A school re-
quirement which would require the mandatory use of one of the prohib-
ited books would certainly violate the belief in avoiding sin. The
mandatory use of those books would certainly be a burden upon a Catholic
child's free exercise.
92. The district court found that "[pilaintiffs' religious beliefs compel
them to refrain from exposure to the Holt series." Mozert, 647 F. Supp at
1200 (emphasis added). According to Judge Boggs, "[t]he plaintiffs pro-
vided voluminous testimony of the conflict (in their view) between reading
the Holt readers and their religious beliefs, including extensive Scriptural
references." Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1076 (Boggs, J., concurring). See also
Strossen, supra note 34, at 390 & n. 288 (arguing that mere exposure can
constitute a substantial burden).
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analysis of the Mozert claim, therefore, is seemingly predi-
cated on a denial that "mere exposure" is a religious belief.9"
This runs directly counter to the Supreme Court's "hands
off" attitude toward the issue whether particular beliefs are
religious or not. As a general matter, a court may not inquire
into the truth of a belief nor may a court decide the particu-
lar importance of a belief. The court may only consider the
sincerity of the belief.94
Religious beliefs similar to those at issue in the Mozert
case have been brought before the Supreme Court earlier. In
this regard, separationism (in the sense of absolute separa-
tionism)95 as religiously-motivated conduct was recognized in
Yoder." In Yoder, the Old Order Amish believed that salva-
93. Although Lively did not expressly dismiss the validity of such a
belief, the Judge's treatment and characterization of the Mozert plaintiffs'
testimony and claims suggests an impatience with their position. See gener-
ally text of opinion, Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827
F.2d 1058, 1060-65 (6th Cir. 1987).
94. The Supreme Court has generally taken a hands-off attitude to-
wards inquiring into the truth of religious beliefs, holding that such inquiry
is in itself violative of individual religious autonomy. In United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), Justice Douglas' majority opinion held that
the first amendment barred submission to the jury of the truth or verity of
respondents' religious doctrine or beliefs. See also Thomas v. Review
Board, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1980) ("We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a
line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable
one."). This position has also been supported by various commentators,
suggesting that such inquiries are beyond the practical and institutional
competence of the courts. See, e.g. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-6; Paulsen,
supra note 8, at 332 & n. 104; Note, supra note 25, at 359-61 & nn. 60-61;
Weiss, Privilege, Posture, and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J.
593, 622 (1964) (assessing religious beliefs in itself intrudes into religious
freedom).
95. For a description of the ways "separationism" is used in this note,
see supra note 91.
96. The Mozert plaintiffs heavily relied upon Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406
U.S. 205 (1972). Judge Lively dismissed its importance, however, stating
that in no way does Yoder announce the general principle regarding expo-
sure. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1067. Perhaps Yoder does not stand for such a
general principle. However, Yoder need not be restricted to its facts. As one
commentator argued, the emphasis in Yoder upon the lengthy and consis-
tent history of the Amish faith was not set forth in the opinion as the sine
qua non for the religious exemption. Taken in this light, the emphasis
demonstrated "the sincerity of their religious beliefs [in separationism], the
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life . . . and the hazards
presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to
others." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. "Viewed in this context, and read in con-
junction with Sherbert, Yoder may be said to have substantially expanded the
area in which free exercise claims may be viably asserted." Marcus, supra
note 40, at 1230.
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tion required an existence separate from the world and its
influences.97 This separationist belief dictated that the Amish
children be protected from views and values taught in the
schools which would alienate them from God and deny them
salvation. Judge Lively rejected the use of Yoder as a general
precedent that mere exposure is protected conduct. How-
ever, Yoder's importance to the particular claim in Mozert is to
show that religiously-motivated avoidance of certain views
and teachings can be protected conduct. 98 Moreover, there is
no reason to believe that the Amish are the only religious
sect to believe in separationism."1
The Sherbert approach recognized that religiously-moti-
vated conduct can be burdened. According to Sherbert, to
condition the receipt of a public benefit (here, public educa-
tion) upon some conduct which is contrary to a person's reli-
gious belief is essentially to burden religiously-motivated con-
duct. While Sherbert may not protect all religiously-motivated
conduct, if a plaintiff makes a showing of burdened con-
duct,100 a thorough examination of the state's interest and a
97. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-18. The Court, quoting from the Bible,
states that the biblical command from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans,
"be not conformed to this world . . .," is fundamental to the Amish faith.
The Court recognized this belief as requiring that the Amish children not
attend school past the eighth grade.
98. See supra note 95. The first amendment religion clauses do not
generally protect against the mere exposure to ideas or beliefs that are of-
fensive to or supportive of any religion. See Strossen, supra note 34, at 374-
75 & n. 221 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (The
fact that Congressional funding restrictions upon abortions "may coincide
with the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without
more, contravene the Establishment Clause.")); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952) (constitutional guarantees of free speech and
press prevent state from banning film on basis of censor's conclusion that it
is "sacrilegious," because "the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
any or all religions from views distasteful to them ...... ). Strossen also
claims that exposure to ideas inconsistent with arguably religious beliefs
generally does not violate the free exercise clause. Note the word "gener-
ally." Strossen argues that if a plaintiff could show a religious belief in
avoiding exposure, then mere exposure could violate the free exercise
clause. Strossen, supra note 34, at 390 n. 288.
99. See Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public
Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515, 524-25 (1978).
100. Strossen suggests that within the public school curricula decision
context the plaintiff must make an initial showing that the challenged cur-
ricula decision imposed a substantial burden upon a sincerely held religious
belief which is centrally important and that any compelling interest in that
curricula decision is substantially achieved even if the proposed accommo-
dation remedy is granted. Strossen, supra note 34, at 390.
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consideration of whether that interest can be furthered by
less burdensome means is required. Rejection of the religious
belief behind the conduct (other than its sincerity) is
improper. 101
Furthermore, Judge Lively's opinion effectively resur-
rects the direct-indirect distinction abandoned in Sherbert.' 2
In Mozert, the school board clearly conditioned access to the
public schools upon the requirement that a student use the
Holt series in the reading course. Although the plaintiffs
were never directly compelled to violate a religious belief,
they were indirectly compelled through the condition on be-
ing allowed to attend the public school. After Sherbert,
"[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by religious belief, . . . a burden
upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect,
the infringement upon the free exercise is nonetheless
substantial."10 3
Judge Lively's inquiry into the existence of a burden
through compulsion is contrary to the approach adopted in
recent Supreme Court rulings.' Moreover, his dismissal of
Strossen also suggests what the required showing for a plaintiff who chal-
lenged a curricula requirement should be. Strossen, supra note 34, at 385.
These criteria are based upon Supreme Court decisions. Within the specific
context of schools, she proposed the following:
Any student asserting a free exercise challenge to a public school
curricular decision, and proposing an accommodation measure to
remedy the alleged violation, would bear the initial burden of
making a prima facie showing that: (1) the challenged decision im-
poses a significant burden upon an arguably religious belief, which
is both sincerely held and centrally important; (2) any compelling
interest that is promoted by the curricular decision could be sub-
stantially achieved even if the proposed accommodation remedy is
granted; and (3) the proposed accommodation remedy is no more
extensive than necessary to eliminate any free exercise violation,
would not cause significant inconvenience, and would not for any
other reason violate the establishment clause.
Id. at 390 (footnotes omitted).
101. See supra note 94.
102. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963).
103. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1980).
104. Two recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on Judge
Lively's analysis. In Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S.Ct. 1310 (1986), the
plaintiff contended that the free exercise clause protected his right to wear
a yarmulke while in uniform, notwithstanding an Air Force regulation
mandating uniform dress for Air Force personnel. Although Goldman did
not prevail due to the finding of an overriding interest, the Court's reason-
ing did not involve an inquiry into whether this kind of religiously-moti-
vated conduct was protected. In fact, the court did find a substantial bur-
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the claim that reading and discussion (mere exposure) bur-
dens a religious belief leads one to conclude that Judge Lively
does not himself believe that this is a valid religious belief.105
Judge Lively never reached the question of whether the state
interest justifies the burden by a compelling state interest. It
was, however, the centerpiece of Judge Kennedy's
concurrence.
den on Goldman's religious practice. The Court found instead that the Air
Force had a compelling interest which outweighed the imposition of the
burden. See id. at 1314.
Similarly, in Bowen v. Roy, 106 S.Ct. 2148 (1986), the Court addressed a
claim that the required use of a Social Security number, in order for the
plaintiffs to obtain welfare benefits, violated the plaintiffs' free exercise
rights. The plaintiffs in this case were Native Americans whose religious
beliefs dictate that the assignment of a number to their two-year-old
daughter would prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power. A key
fact in the case was that although the parents had refused to apply for a
Social Security number, it was disclosed after the initial trial that the gov-
ernment had already assigned the child a number. Since this was the case,
the remainder of plaintiffs' claim was directed at enjoining the state wel-
fare agency from using it. The majority of the Court held that the statu-
tory requirement that a state agency (as opposed to the plaintiffs) use the
number in administering the welfare programs did not violate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. See Id. at 2151-53. Importantly, five justices indicated that a
burden on plaintiffs' free exercise rights would have existed had the plain-
tiff, rather than a state agency, been required to use the number. See Id. at
2154 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) Id. at 2165-69, (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.) Id. at
2169, (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Court once again recognized
that an indirect burden arising from a facially neutral law can involve com-
pulsion when it requires a person to engage in a religiously forbidden prac-
tice in order to receive benefits. See Id. at 2154 (opinion of Burger, C.J.)
("we do not believe that no government compulsion is involved").
Both of these recent decisions reflect the Court's approach to the bur-
dened conduct issues. They show the willingness of the Court to accept a
plaintiff's claim as to the religious reasons behind the burdened conduct,
and to concentrate instead on a strict scrutiny analysis of the state's inter-
est. Even in these two cases where the plaintiffs were not successful, the
Court did not engage in any in-depth analysis of compulsion.
105. But see, Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714, "[Rjeligious beliefs need not
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection." Also, as Justice Douglas stated in his
concurring opinion in Sherbert, "The result turns not on the degree of the
injury, which may indeed be non-existent by ordinary standards. The harm
is the interference with the individual's scruples of conscience - an impor-
tant area of privacy which the First Amendment fences off from govern-
ment. The interference here is as plain as it is in Soviet Russia, where a
churchgoer is given second-class citizenship, resulting in harm though per-
haps not measurable damages." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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B. Judge Kennedy: Overriding Compelling State Interest
Judge Kennedy wrote "even if I were to conclude that
requiring the use of the Holt series or another similar series
constituted a burden on [plaintiffs'] free exercise rights, I
would find the burden justified by a compelling state inter-
est."' " This conclusion is questioned here, however, because
under Sherbert, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."
' 0°
According to Judge Kennedy, the state has a compelling
state interest in achieving both literacy and citizenship for
the children.0 8 Moreover, she accepted the proposition that
the state has an additional compelling interest in teaching
students how to think critically about complex and controver-
sial subjects and to develop their own ideas and make judg-
ments about these subjects.109 As Judge Kennedy argued,
critical reading skills in themselves were necessary ingredi-
ents to "good citizenship" as that type of discussion helps to
develop respect and tolerance for other views.
Even if this interest is compelling, however, the question
106. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1070 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). Other cases have
described the state's interest requirement as "compelling," Thomas v. Re-
view Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1980); "overriding," United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982); "of the highest order," Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972); and "especially important," Bowen v. Roy, 106 S.Ct.
2147, 2167 (1986).
108. The district court made this specific finding as to the state inter-
est involved. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194,
1202 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). Contrast this state interest with what Judge Ken-
nedy described as the state interest: the state has a compelling interest not
only in teaching children how to read, but a further interest in teaching
them how to read critically. This premise is crucial to Judge Kennedy's
finding of an overriding state interest. If one accepts Judge Hull's view
from the district court opinion, then clearly no argument could be made
that the mandatory use of one textbook is absolutely the least restrictive
means available to teach children literacy and good citizenship. Indeed, the
testimony of one teacher showed that teaching is best accomplished
through individualized instruction, sometimes requiring students to use dif-
ferent books to receive specialized instruction. Id. at 1201 and n.12.
However, if one accepts Judge Kennedy's view, then it is easier to accept
that one textbook should be used. If the children are expected to read and
discuss moral and social issues as they arise in stories, then it makes sense
to have the children reading the same material.
109. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring in result).
Undoubtedly, this type of discussion is a social good; it teaches tolerance
for others in our pluralistic democratic society. One must question, how-
ever, whether first grade or elementary students in general will be discuss-
ing "complex and controversial moral and social issues."
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remains as to whether the Holt reader is the least restrictive
means of furthering it. Would this compelling state interest
be harmed by allowing the plaintiffs to read another
reader?110 Like the children in Yoder,"' it can be argued that
the plaintiff-children in this case would learn to form judg-
ments about moral and social issues, even with alternative
readers. If this is not the case, then some showing is required
that this particular reading series is necessary to good citizen-
ship and the related skill to think critically.
It is apparent that the Holt series was not the only or
least restrictive means to achieve the state's interest. Prior to
the compelled use of the Holt readers, accommodation was
taking place, with no evidence whatsoever of alleged bad ef-
fects. Judge Kennedy disagreed 11 and made a number of ob-
servations. She found mandatory participation to be the least
restrictive means since plaintiffs would object regardless of
which series was selected. " She also said that use of the Holt
series (or one similar) promotes cohesion among a democratic
people " ' ; that any accommodation would promote disrup-
tion in the classroom, religious divisiveness, and a flood of
future claims" 5 ; and finally, that any accommodation would
not solve the plaintiffs' problems given the integrated nature
of the school's reading programs. 6
Each of these objectives is highly speculative and is the
type of speculation which the Sherbert line of cases expressly
110. Note that in Yoder the Court stated that "[w]here fundamental
claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, we cannot accept such a
sweeping claim; despite its validity in the generality of cases, we must
searchingly examine the interests that the state seeks to promote by its re-
quirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the impediment to
those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish ex-
emption." 406 U.S. at 222.
111. Such alternative means furthering the state objective were im-
portant to the Yoder Court. Id. at 223-24.
112. Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058,
1071-72 (6th Cir. 1987) (Kennedy, J., concurring in result).
113. Id. at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring in result). This statement
directly contradicts the plaintiffs' own testimony which stated that their ob-
jections were specifically against the Holt series and that they would accept
another state-approved text.
114. Id. at 1072 (Kennedy, J., concurring in result).
115. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in result).
116. Judge Kennedy referred to the approach that teachers take to
reinforce information taught in different subject areas. Students may be
called upon to discuss one of the Holt stories later in the day. Thus, schools
would be able to utilize effectively the critical reading method and also ac-
commodate the plaintiffs' religious beliefs.
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rejected.1 17 Speculation as to future claims, administrative in-
convenience, efficiency, and cost-saving reasons are not in
themselves sufficient to justify a substantial (although indi-
rect) intrusion upon religious freedom." 8 The Sherbert test
requires proof of least restrictive means. As Judge Boggs
pointed out in his concurring opinion, "[tihe test for a com-
pelling interest is quite strict, and requires far more than this
or other speculations on possible future evils. Once again, to
be compelling, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." '9
In contrast to the speculation in Mozert, the Yoder Court
focused on specifics. While compulsory education may have
presented a substantial state interest, forcing the Amish chil-
dren specifically to go to school beyond the eighth grade was
not required to satisfy the state's interest. 120 In fact, the
Court stated that there was no basis, other than the state's
allegations, to find that education past the eighth grade
would better prepare the Amish children for society, even for
society outside the Amish community.121 "Insofar as the
State's claim rests on the view that a brief additional period
of formal education is imperative to enable the Amish to par-
ticipate effectively and intelligently in our democratic pro-
cess, it must fall." ' 2 Similarly, in the Mozert case, no facts in
117. See, e.g., Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972). "Where
fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, we cannot
accept such a sweeping claim.").
118. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); TRIBE, supra
note 7, § 14-10, at 853.
119. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1077 (Boggs, J., concurring) (quoting Sher-
bert, 374 U.S. at 406 (1963).
120. The Yoder Court could not find any particular state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the
free exercise clause. The State could not show how "its admittedly strong
interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting
an exemption to the Amish." 406 U.S. at 214, 237. The Amish believed
that education after the eighth grade would expose the children to views
which would alienate them from God, endanger the community and the
parents and children's salvation. See Id. at 218-19.
121. "There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish qual-
ities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would fail to find
ready markets in today's society. Absent some contrary evidence support-
ing the state's position, we are unwilling to assume that persons possessing
such valuable vocational skills and habits are doomed to become burdens
on society should they determine to leave the Amish faith, nor is there any
basis in the record to warrant a finding that an additional one or two years
of formal school education beyond the eighth grade would serve to elimi-
nate any such problem that might exist." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225-26.
122. Id.
[Vol. 3
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
the record establish with the required specificity that alterna-
tive textbooks would be less effective in developing the plain-
tiff-children as good citizens.
Given the state's heavy burden and the strict scrutiny
analysis the Supreme Court applies, the evidence relied upon
by Judge Kennedy, based, as it was, on educational policy
speculation and administrative conveniences, should not be
sufficient to overcome a substantial burden on religious
beliefs.
C. Judge Boggs: Burdened Conduct, But No Constitutional
Protection
Judge Boggs also wrote a separate concurring opinion,23
in which he made two major points: first, he found a burden
on free exercise which was beyond constitutional protection;
second, he wrote that the school board has the freedom to
say "my way or the highway."12 '
Judge Boggs found what he called a common sense bur-
den on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs."' 5 In fact, he stated,
"there is a much stronger economic compulsion in public
schooling than by any unemployment system.""O His refusal
to extend the principles of Sherbert to cover this case, how-
ever, stems from his belief that not all religiously-motivated
conduct is -deserving of protection.2 This belief was bol-
123. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1073 (Boggs, J., concurring in result).
124. Id. at 1074 (Boggs, J., concurring in result).
125. "In any sensible meaning of a burden, the burden in our case is
greater than in Thomas or Sherbert.. . . Here, the burden is many years of
education, being required to study books that, in plaintiffs' view, systemati-
cally undervalue, contradict and ignore their religion." Id. at 1079 (Boggs,
J., concurring in result).
126. Id. (Boggs, J., concurring in result).
127. Much of the same criticisms against Judge Lively's treatment of
the burden issue apply to Judge Boggs' treatment of the case. His summary
dismissal of the burden claim avoids proper application of the Sherbert test.
Both Judge Boggs's and Judge Lively's analysis prevented consideration of
the particular facts and circumstances of the parties involved and hence
applied only a personal judgment as to what constituted a valid religious
practice.
Another factor in Judge Boggs decision not to "expand" the free exer-
cise clause to protect plaintiffs' religious practices was that the Supreme
Court has "almost never interfered with the prerogatives of school boards
to set curricula, based on free exercise claims." Id. (Boggs, J., concurring in
result).
1988]
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
stered by his further belief that the only limitation on a
school board is the establishment clause.128
In deciding whether or not to give constitutional protec-
tion to the plaintiffs' burdened religious practices, Judge
Boggs discussed a distinction between kinds of religiously mo-
tivated conduct: conduct which is required by a religious be-
lief and conduct which is merely better according to a reli-
gious belief. The free exercise clause, according to Judge
Boggs, only protects conduct which is required by a religious
belief. Judge Boggs rejected the view that true protection of
religious beliefs means that protection must be accorded for
all "arguably religious" beliefs.12' Judge Boggs' approach is
flawed, however, in that it necessarily involves a judgment as
to how important a particular practice is to a religion. A
court is not qualified to judge how essential a particular belief
is to a religion. This type of inquiry is the very type the
Court has always avoided. " '
Although the Supreme Court has protected conduct
under the free exercise clause, it has never expressly adopted
either the "arguably religious" approach or the narrow view
Judge Boggs adopted. The only express guidelines, other
than the general rule of avoiding inquiry into what is a reli-
gious belief, are those from the Sherbert approach, in which
the conduct is evaluated in terms of whether there is a state
interest sufficiently compelling to override the burdened reli-
gious beliefs. 8
128. Id. at 1080 (Boggs, J., concurring in result). Judge Boggs em-
phasized that the Supreme Court typically avoids becoming involved with
school boards and their decisionmaking. However, where a constitutional
question is involved, the Court does not hesitate to get involved.
By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the
control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily op-
eration of school systems and which do not directly and sharply
implicate basic constitutional values. On the other hand, "[t]he
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vi-
tal than in the community of American Schools."
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (citing Shdton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960)).
129. Laurence Tribe takes this approach and argues for protection
for all "arguably religious beliefs." TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-6, at 828.
130. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
131. The Court has, however, stated that certain religiously-moti-
vated acts are not totally free from restrictions. Yet those practices which
traditionally have not received protection "have invariably posed some sub-
stantial threat to public safety, peace or order." Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1937);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1879)).
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Judge Boggs' concurrence also stated that "the school
board is indeed entitled to say, 'my way or the highway.' ""
In the early part of his opinion, Judge Boggs criticized both
Judge Lively's and Judge Kennedy's treatment of the case.
Both, he said, ignored the real issue, namely, "the extent to
which school systems may constitutionally require students to
use educational materials that are objectionable, contrary to,
or forbidden by their religious beliefs." 183 According to
Boggs, "[s]chool boards may set curricula bounded only by
the establishment clause.""
This statement is at least troubling, if not inaccurate. Ini-
tially, it puts the school board on a pedestal, virtually al-
lowing it to do as it pleases. Moreover, it implies that the only
possible objections to curriculum requirements are religious
objections. This is not the case. For example, the selection and
the required use of a textbook 3 5 which was obscene, racist or
discriminatory would be subject to constitutional attack." 6
132. Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058,
1074 (6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs, J., concurring in result).
133. Id. (Boggs, J., concurring in result).
134. Id. at 1080 (Boggs, J., concurring in result).
135. This situation is distinguished from Board of Education, Island
Trees Union Free School District v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), where the
Court held that local school boards may not remove books from the library
shelf simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and
seek their removal in order to prescribe what the school board believes
should be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of
opinion. Important to the Pico Court was that the school board intended to
deny access to ideas with which the school board disagreed. Such action
substantially implicated and infringed upon the first amendment rights of
the students. Moreover, the Court emphasized the unique role of the
school library - that the use of the books was completely voluntary on the
part of the students.
Pico is distinguishable from any case involving a claim for the removal of
books from the curriculum for such reasons as obscenity, racism or the
like. First, even in Pico, the court noted that the school board could re-
move books from the library which were "pervasively vulgar" or educa-
tionally unsuitable. Id. at 871. But most significant is the fact that the Pico
Court was concerned with the denial of access to ideas. No such right is
implicated in the choice of one required textbook for a particular course.
If so, then every textbook choice would be invalid. Finally, the Court also
noted that the school board might be able to defend their claim of absolute
discretion with respect to curriculum by reliance upon their duty to incul-
cate community values. Id. at 869.
136. If a textbook contained stories and passages alleged to be ob-
scene, or racist, it is unlikely that such a textbook would withstand a consti-
tutional attack. For example, in Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138
(N.D. Miss. 1980), a court held that a textbook selected for use in the
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There is no constitutional basis to justify exempting a school
board's curricular choice from any portion of the constitu-
tion. 137 Perhaps for this reason, Judge Boggs himself admits
that he would not completely rule out a free exercise claim in
this context.1 88
CONCLUSION
In its treatment of the Mozert claim, the Sixth Circuit
court appears to dismiss the reality and sincerity of the plain-
tiffs' religious beliefs. The idiosyncrasies of the plaintiffs' be-
liefs should be irrelevant. Yet, in holding that particular reli-
state's 9th grade Mississippi history course was unconstitutional as it in-
tended to perpetuate segregation. The court found that there was a motive
to discriminate.
California is an example of a state which recognizes that a textbook may
be subject to claims other than the establishment clause: "No textbook or
other instructional materials shall be adopted by the school board or any
governing board for use in the public schools which contain any matter
reflecting adversely upon persons because of their race, sex, color, creed,
national origin or ancestry." Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 51501 (Special Pam-
phlet 1978).
137. Strossen takes the position that school board curriculum choices
are also subject to free exercise analysis.
Even if a curricular decision withstands scrutiny under the estab-
lishment clause analysis, . . . it does not follow that every student
must be affected uniformly by that decision, notwithstanding ob-
jections based upon arguably religious beliefs. Under free exercise
clause precedents, individual students whose arguably religious be-
liefs are violated by exposure to certain curricular material may be
protected from such exposure.
Strossen, supra note 34, at 385.
Moreover, objections to curriculum requirements have succeeded under
free exercise claims. See, e.g., Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir.
1972) (where a high school student, who had a religiously-based conscien-
tious objection to war, refused to take a state-required ROTC course; the
Sixth Circuit held that the school's requirement violated the plaintiff's free
exercise rights since it compelled the student to engage in training con-
trary to religious beliefs). See also Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D.
I1. 1979) (where elementary school children refused to participate in co-ed
physical education classes, based on religious objection to exposure to the
opposite sex in immodest attire; the court found that the children's free
exercise rights had been violated). Judge Hull, in the district court opinion,
cited and relied upon both of these cases in reaching the decision that a
burden existed in the Mozert case.
138. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1075 (recognizing that exposure to or use of
books could be conduct prohibited by a religion, and, consequently, a bur-
den on religious exercise.); id. at 1079 n.8 (agreeing with the court's opin-
ion that forcing students to participate in a religious ritual contrary to their
beliefs would be a violation of their free exercise rights).
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gious beliefs are not deserving of constitutional protection,
the court made an impermissible judgment about the merit
of religious belief. Moreover, in its abstract discussion of
compulsion and incomplete evaluation of state interests, the
Sixth Circuit failed to consider the particular facts and char-
acteristics of the plaintiffs involved.' 39 It would not have re-
quired a significant step in free exercise jurisprudence to pro-
tect the plaintiffs' free exercise rights. The court needed only
faithfully to apply the principles in Sherbert and Yoder. Mozert
exemplifies the problems which parents may encounter with
the public school system. Since education is viewed as a mat-
ter of state and local concern, the Supreme Court has empha-
sized that courts ought not to interfere except in clear cases
of constitutional violation.140 Where no violation is shown,
then the school board may be entitled to say "my way or the
highway." But the prospect of leaving one's free exercise
rights at the schoolhouse door is troubling. 4'
The district court's opinion in Mozert evidenced that a
139. Although curriculum disputes involve the parents and the
schools, the children are the ones affected by such conflicts. Unfortunately,
the Sixth Circuit failed to mention this aspect when looking at the free
exercise claim. Perhaps if the court had evaluated the claim, in light of the
particular characteristics of the children, it would have reached a different
result.
For instance, in the past, the Supreme Court has based part of its analysis
on the needs of the particular subjects involved, acting to protect children
in the elementary school context. See, e.g., three cases which demonstrate
the degree of protection the Court sees necessary to protect children's au-
tonomy, depending on their age and special characteristics: Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (in invalidating a state's Shared Time program
on establishment clause grounds, the Court paid particular attention to the
impressionability of the elementary school children and the possibility of
indoctrination, that violates a youth's religious autonomy); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (in recognizing that adolescents are capable of making
informed choices, the Court held that a state cannot require parental or
judicial consent for non-emergency abortions); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (recognizing that college students are capable of appreciat-
ing that a university's policy of allowing religious groups equal access to
meeting rooms on campus was one of neutrality). The Court no doubt rec-
ognized the need to protect the autonomy of these children, since, left to
their own devices, children do not have the resources or the ability to pro-
tect it for themselves. See Assaf, Autonomous Adolescents, Sexual Responsibil-
ity, Religious Organizations, and Congress: An Illicit Church/State Relationship?,
3 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 425 (1988).
140. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
141. Some cases have been decided with regard to other areas of the
curricula. See, e.g., Spence v. Bailey and Moody v. Cronin, supra note 137.
See Strossen's article, supra note 34, for claims against textbook choices
based on the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
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reasonable balance in this case could be reached in complete
accordance with the existing Supreme Court free exercise
precedents. But where does the Sixth Circuit's decision leave
us? At most in a state of confusion. The fact that none of the
three judges' explanations commanded a majority demon-
strates a confusion about the free exercise clause in general
and about the Mozert claim in particular. Unfortunately, this
confusion will remain until the Supreme Court decides to of-
fer further guidance in the application of the Sherbert
approach.
142
142. As Justice Stewart said in Sherbert, "our Constitution commands
positive protection by government of religious freedom - not only for the
minority, however small - not only for the majority, however large - but
for each of us . . . . [T]he guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the
free exercise clause affirmatively requires government to create an atmo-
sphere of hospitality and accommodation to individual belief or disbelief."
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at, 415 (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
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